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Krzysztof Kredens
On the Status of Linguistic Evidence in Litigation
Abstrakt. Autor omawia status dowodów z opinii językoznawcy w systemie prawnym 
common law w Anglii i USA. Następnie przedstawia kwestię dowodów z opinii języko-
znawcy w Polsce. Wysuwa wniosek, że naukowe znaczenie takich dowodów jest tylko 
jednym z determinantów jego znaczenia prawnego. Wydaje się, iż znaczenie dowodów 
z opinii językoznawcy w kontekście prawnym jest jednocześnie uwarunkowane czynnikami 
innymi niż faktyczny stan rzeczy ustalony przez biegłego.
Abstract. The author discusses the status of expert linguistic evidence in common law 
systems of England and the USA. Then he touches upon the issue of linguistic evidence 
in Poland. It is concluded that the scientific validity of expert evidence is only one of 
the determinants of its legal status. It appears that the status of linguistic evidence in the 
legal setting is simultaneously conditioned by factors other than the scientific actuality 
of expert findings.
1. Introduction
Forensic linguistics has undergone an unprecedented academic growth in the last 
two decades. From a somewhat exotic enterprise banned to the most obscure corners 
of Academia, it has flourished into a fully-fledged scientific field. This status trans-
formation came about with the recognition that having consolidated linguistic and 
legal interests into an applied discipline, forensic linguistics can address and control 
crucial social issues. 
Social reality is governed by certain laws, the provision and execution of which 
depends upon legislative and judicial activity. Forensic linguistics and the law are thus 
directly related. This paper considers why the relationship is by no means a harmonious 
one. The considerations below will be limited to the status of linguistic expert evidence 
in the legal systems of England and the United States, though a reference will also be 
made to the Polish judiciary. It is understood, at the same time, that the problems dis-
cussed apply in a broader legal context, i.e. are representative of legal systems based 
on English common law as well as modern Roman law. By linguistic evidence will be 
understood the testimony of a linguist giving expert evidence in a court of law.
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Before proceeding, a few key terms need to be explained for the sake of avoiding 
terminology confusion. To begin with, it should not be unreasonable to clarify the 
notion of evidence, as used in the legal context:
Evidence [is a]ny species of proof, or probative matter, legally presented at the trial of an issue, by 
the act of the parties and through the medium of witnesses, records, documents, exhibits, concrete 
objects, etc., for the purpose of inducing belief in the minds of the court or jury as to their conten-
tion. (Black 1997: 555)
Expert evidence, in turn, is normally defined as: 
evidence the relevance and probative value of which depends upon the witness having some special 
knowledge or skill, other than having directly perceived a fact. (Robertson and Vignaux 1995: 199)
It differs from expert testimony in that the latter is used to denote “opinions stated 
during trial or deposition by a specialist qualified as an expert on a subject relevant 
to a lawsuit or a criminal case” (Hill and Hill 1995: 124), or, in other words, “what 
the witness thinks, believes, or infers in regard to facts in dispute, as distinguished 
from his personal knowledge of the facts themselves” (Black 1997: 1093). 
In the common law systems of England and the United States, any evidence, before 
actually being utilised in either an incriminating or exculpatory capacity, has to be al-
lowed to be introduced at trial – or admitted. Admissible evidence is that “which the 
trial judge finds is useful in helping the trier of fact and which cannot be objected to on 
the basis that it is irrelevant [or] immaterial (...)” (Hill and Hill 1995: 12) To qualify as 
admissible, evidence must then be relevant, i.e. “tend to establish material proposition” 
(Black 1997: 47); relevancy is the basic rule of evidence law. The rule provides that:
evidence which is relevant is admissible unless it is excluded by some other rule or its probative 
value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (Robertson and Vignaux: 1995: 202)
Once admitted, expert testimony can be found to constitute either probative 
evidence, i.e.:
means having the effect of proof; tending to prove, or actually proving an issue; that which furnishes, 
establishes, or contributes toward proof. (Black 1997: 1203)
or corroborating evidence, which is “supplementary to that already given and tending 
to strengthen or confirm it” (Black 1997: 344). In real-life legal contexts linguistic 
evidence is hardly ever probative and often corroborating. 
3. Expert and linguistic evidence in common law systems
3.1. England
In England the admissibility of expert evidence in criminal trials is regulated by, 
inter alia, provisions contained in the 1988 Criminal Justice Act. Procedural rather 
than constrictive, they do not impose any special requirements for the admissibility 
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of expert evidence other than relevance and reliability. As a result “a field need not 
be generally accepted before expert testimony is admissible but it must be sufficiently 
established to be reliable” (Uglow 1997: 619). In reality, any expert witness must 
establish his/her credentials, which should be the result of practical experience and/or 
professional qualification (Uglow 1997). He or she is therefore expected to give full 
details of his/her education, training, publications and experience, including experience 
as an expert witness. (Robertson and Vignaux 1995). Whether the witness qualifies 
as an expert is invariably resolved by the judge, as is the issue of whether a field is 
sufficiently established. 
In the main, English judges view expert opinions on language use with caution. 
This is especially so in cases where questions relating to contested meaning must be 
resolved (but not limited to them). Judges are often disinclined to admit (let alone 
commission) such testimony on the grounds that they themselves, as native speak-
ers, have got the capacity to understand and unequivocally interpret the meaning of 
the linguistic matter in question. Judges’ reluctance to consider linguistic evidence 
on meaning is exemplified by an English Court of Appeal ruling in a case of assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm, as described in Stubbs (1996). Lord Chief Justice, 
having rejected linguistic testimony demonstrating how the language of a lower-court 
judge’s summing-up may have influenced the decision of the jury, proclaimed that: 
(...) what the meaning is of the language used by a learned Judge in the course of his directions to 
the jury is a matter for this Court to determine and is not a matter for any linguistic expert. (Stubbs 
1996: 239)
Coulthard (1997) reports on a case in which he gave evidence as expert witness. 
The accused, found guilty of carrying out four armed robberies in the Liverpool area 
in April 1986, claimed that a police officer had fabricated the record of a journey in 
a police car the accused made with him and two other police officers to determine 
his wherebouts at the time when one of the robberies took place. From a linguist’s 
point of view, the results of Coulthard’s analysis showed unequivocally that the 
document had indeed been fabricated, but nevertheless failed to convince the court. 
However, in another case where Coulthard provided expert evidence on authorship 
(Regina v. Derek William Bentley 1998), the Appeals Court not only admitted it but 
found relevant as well, which resulted in a posthumous pardon for the defendant, 46 
years after he was executed for a crime he had not committed. The Bentley case is 
certainly a milestone for the use of linguistic evidence in litigation.
In yet another case relating to authorship attribution, stylometric evidence was 
proffered in the Court of Appeal, which – having rejected it – pointed to “the absence 
of a broad enough basis for this stylometric research” (Regina v. St Germain 1977; in 
Robertson and Vignaux 1995: 186), as well as stated that “[the expert witness] had been 
unable to advance his conclusions beyond that of hypothesis” (idem). At the same time, 
however, stylometric evidence has been admitted in a number of cases [e.g. The Queen 
v. McCrossen (1991) or Regina v. Mitchell (1993)], although with no significant impact 
upon the verdict. As Robertson and Vignaux (1995: 186) find, “no ruling relating to the 
admissibility of the stylometric evidence appears to have been recorded”.
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3.2. USA
Based upon English common law, the legal system of the United States has as 
one of its precepts the doctrine of precedent. In the main, it consists in applying by 
the judges principles of law which, rather than being enacted by legislative bodies, 
are the result of earlier judicial decisions, or precedents. As regards expert evidence 
two cases in particular have had an enormous impact upon its legal status: Frye v. US 
and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
The most common standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence in the 
United States is known as the Frye rule, so named in recognition of the 1923 federal 
court case of James Frye, a man accused of murder. Frye’s lawyer urged the court to 
admit in evidence the results of a polygraph test on the grounds of the general rule 
allowing experts to testify on matters of specialised experience or knowledge. Because 
the polygraph was a new technology, however, the court imposed a more stringent 
rule; refusing to admit the evidence, it justified its decision in the following way: 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and de-
monstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the 
principle must be recognised, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony 
deduced from a well-recognised scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction 
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to 
which it belongs. (Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1030: 1923)
The Frye ruling proved momentous. Having imposed requirements for admissibili-
ty additional to evidential relevance, it set the standard for the use of expert evidence 
for the next seventy years; it was not until 1993 that a ruling in a civil case marked 
the end of the “general acceptance” test.
In 1993 William Daubert, a US citizen, sued for damages the manufacturers of 
a prescription drug marketed under the name Bendectin, which – developed to relieve 
symptoms of nausea during pregnancy – he claimed to have caused his children’s birth 
defects. Most notably, the plaintiff introduced evidence by expert witnesses whose 
testimony had not been subjected to peer review. On June 28th 1993, the US Supreme 
Court decided that the Frye test was no longer valid and that it was superseded by 
Federal Rules of Evidence. Instead of “general acceptance” in the scientific commu-
nity, the Daubert standard requires an independent judicial assessment of reliability, 
as stated in the verdict:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702, the trial judge (...) must make 
a preliminary assessment of whether the testimony’s underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifi-
cally valid and properly can be applied to the facts at issue. (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
951 F.2d 1128: 1993)
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony and 
provides that: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialised knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. (Fed. 
R. Evid. 702: 1975)
 On the Status of Linguistics Evidence in Litigation 27
The Rule therefore has three crucial requirements: 1. the expert may testify about 
substance relating to scientific, technical, or other specialised knowledge, 2. the ex-
pert’s testimony must assist the trier of fact, and 3. the expert must qualify as such by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. The determination as to whether 
these requirements are satisfied rests with the judge, who – as Daubert provides – is 
required “to play a more pro-active role as gatekeeper in relation to scientific testi-
mony” (Uglow 1997: 619). 
So far as linguistic evidence is concerned, it has enjoyed mixed fortunes in US 
courtrooms. This is especially true of voiceprint identification, which – though at one 
time (in the 1960s and 1970s) was generally accepted as scientifically tenable – to-
day is not normally seen as meeting the criteria of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 
Mentioned here must be the Prinzivalli case (cf. Labov and Harris 1994), in which 
the testimony of a phonetic rather than acoustic nature resulted in the acquittal of 
a defendant accused of felony. Also admitted is typically evidence on the authorship 
of written material, most often wills and ransom notes. McMenamin (1993), for ex-
ample, provides an overview of almost fifty civil and criminal cases where stylistic 
evidence has been admitted.
One landmark case in which stylistic evidence was not admitted is United States 
v. Patricia Hearst. In 1974 Hearst was kidnapped by the members of a terrorist or-
ganisation called the Symbionese Liberation Army. Several months later she joined her 
kidnappers in robbing a bank and was subsequently arrested and sentenced to seven 
years’ imprisonment. During the trial Hearst’s defence tried to persuade the judge to 
admit testimony on the authorship of several tape-recorded revolutionary statements 
spoken by her, on the grounds that they had been prepared by the terrorists, who forced 
Hearst to read them into the tape-recorder. The statements thus allegedly constituted 
evidence of coercion, which meant that, merely a tool of the terrorists, she could 
not be held accountable for the robbery. The trial judge, ruling against the defence’s 
contention, supported his decision with three main arguments (Bailey 1979):
[1.] that the jury was to decide not the question of authorship but sincerity, ‘whether she meant what 
she said’; [2.] that hearing the expert testimony on authorship would be inordinately time-consum-
ing; and [3.] that the relative infancy of this area of scientific endeavour might well have created an 
unjustifiable ‘aura of special reliability and trustworthiness around the testimony’ (1979: 6)
In one recent case, United States v. Roy van Wyk, the authorship of handwritten and 
typed threatening letters was at issue. Van Wyk sought to exclude the proposed expert 
testimony of James R. Fitzgerald, a federal agent and an expert in forensic stylistics, 
on the grounds that he was “not qualified to testify as a forensic stylistics expert” 
(van Wyk v. U.S., Crim. No. 99–217 (WGB): 2000) The defendant also indicated “the 
lack of reliability of the area of linguistic stylistics” (idem). Interestingly, as many as 
twenty-six years after the Hearst case the court still made in its Opinion a reference 
to the “novelty” (idem) of forensic stylistics. What is more, the Opinion questioned 
the scientific tenability of the field: 
The reliability of text analysis (...) is questionable because (...) there is no known rate of error, 
no recognized standard, no meaningful peer review, and no system of accrediting an individual 
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as an expert in the field. Consequently, the existing data for forensic stylistics cannot definitively 
establish (...) that a particular person is “the” author of a particular writing. (van Wyk v. U.S., Crim. 
No. 99–217 (WGB): 2000)
The court’s arguments do not seem uncontroversial. While there is indeed no 
known rate of error in forensic linguistic analysis, peer review is these days certainly 
more than “meaningful”. As for the “recognised standard” argument, it also appears 
rather spurious, given the fact that each individual case is unique and what is standard 
procedure in one type of cases, could not be applicable in others. 
On February 8, 2000, the court issued the following order: 
IT IS (...) ORDERED that Agent Fitzgerald may testify to comparison of characteristics or “markers” 
between the handwritten and typed writings, of which authorship is “questioned” or unknown; 
and 
IT IS (...) ORDERED that Fitzgerald’s testimony regarding any “external” or extrinsic factors and 
his conclusion as to the author of the “questioned” writings are barred.” (van Wyk v. U.S., Crim. 
No. 99–217 (WGB): 2000)
It in principle meant that evidence on forensic stylistics was admitted, though, as 
a closer look at the reasoning in the Opinion suggests, largely on the rule of precedent. 
In any event, the van Wyk ruling is these days an important determinant of the status 
of linguistic evidence in US courts.
3.3. Expert evidence and the adversary system
The common law system is an adversary system. One of its principal charac-
teristics is that, in contending against each other, the opposing parties retain experts 
independently. Importantly, the defence may well choose to ignore any unfavourable 
reports from experts. The adversary system seems therefore by no means conducive 
to an objective provision of scientific facts, as an example of a civil case described 
in Finegan (1990) illustrates. In 1983 a libellous letter listing instances of alleged 
misconduct was sent to the board president of an American corporation. The libelled 
parties filed suit against a person they suspected of writing the letter. To support their 
contention, they consulted a linguist, who, having compared the questioned letter with 
38 letters known to be authored by the defendant, concluded that there was a very 
high probability that the anonymous letter had indeed been written by him. The sound-
ness of the linguist’s methodology was confirmed by another linguist, also hired by 
the plaintiffs, but challenged by two further linguists hired by the defendant. A fifth 
linguist was subsequently consulted by the plaintiffs; he judged the first linguist’s 
methodology to be valid and the case was eventually settled out of court. 
It must be made clear that problems with the provision of expert testimony are 
not peculiar to the adversary system. Kniffka (1994), for example, gives an account 
of a case heard in a German court, in which the expertise of a linguist summoned by 
the court to express an opinion on the authorship of an anonymous letter was found 
to have been carried out in a methodologically improper way, as an expert linguist 
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consulted by the prosecution demonstrated. Similarly, in a case heard in a Polish court 
the judge commissioned as many as five expert witnesses to determine the semantics 
of an allegedly defamatory lexical item. (Bartimpex v. Marian B. 2000).
The principle of the adversary system regulating the presence of experts in court 
may be one reason why no conviction has so far been secured in either England or the 
USA on the basis of linguistic evidence only, which, relatively novel, is particularly 
vulnerable to attack by skilled defence lawyers. 
4. Linguistic evidence in Poland
Based upon Napoleonic law, the Polish legal system is inquisitorial. All expert 
evidence commissioned by the court is admitted automatically. Significantly, most 
forensic science laboratories are run by the police, which again raises serious doubts 
as to the objectivity of expert testimony. At the same time, however, the inquisitorial 
system allows the use of independent experts by prosecution as well as defence.
In Poland the court asks an expert for an opinion if “the uncovering of circum-
stances of importance for the resolution of the case requires special knowledge” 
(Polish Code of Criminal Procedure 193.1). Importantly, not only an expert on the 
court’s register is obliged to make available his/her expertise, but also “any person 
of whom it is known that he or she possesses appropriate knowledge in a given area” 
(ibid 195).
The status of linguistic evidence on authorship attribution in Poland seems to be 
the result of common sense rather than scientific proof. Tape-recorded evidence was 
deemed admissible in criminal trials in Poland by a 1960 Supreme Court ruling and 
it has been used on the assumption that the voice and speech patterns of an individual 
are unique. What is more, such evidence often has probative value, as it had in the 
Augustynek case (cf. Kredens and Góralewska-Łach 1998), in which the accused was 
found guilty effectively on the testimony of an expert linguist. In Augustynek the 
commonsense approach became particularly manifest in the judgement of the Appeals 
Court, which, upholding the conviction, observed that a greater emphasis should have 
been placed in the lower court’s judgement on the unique nature of voice and speech 
patterns and its implications for the verdict.
5. Conclusions
As it stands, the scientific validity of expert evidence is only one of the determi-
nants of its legal status. It appears that the status of linguistic evidence in the legal 
setting is simultaneously conditioned by factors other than the scientific actuality of 
expert findings. What is a consensus in an expert community may for example get 
discredited by courtroom exposure, falling prey to the adversary practice of common 
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law systems, which fact calls into question the capability of the legal adversary process 
for dealing with scientific expertise. Another problem has to do with the institution of 
trial by jury; the intricacies of expert opinion may simply elude lay triers. Finally, as 
is the case with forensic authorship attribution, the same scientific issue, which one 
would expect to be resolved with the same results irrespective of the jurisdiction, is 
decided differently in different legal systems, with different implications for the ver-
dict. The question arises whether forensic linguistic evidence can have probative value 
for language A but not B – it could after all be the case that just as the individuating 
potential of some style markers is greater intralinguistically, some languages provide 
the analyst with more style markers on which to base his/her findings. In any event, it 
seems that the status of linguistic evidence in courts of law can be ameliorated with 
an improved communication between linguists and lawyers; language description need 
not be counterposed against legal procedure axiomatically only if forensic linguistics 
can reinforce its social presence with an invariably unbiased and faithful account of 
what it can and cannot offer.
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